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Abstract This Bioethics and Biopolitics: Presents and
Futures of Reproduction symposium draws together a
series of articles that were each submitted independently
by their authors to the JBI andwhich explore the biopower
axis in the externalization of reproduction in four contexts:
artificial gestation (ectogenesis), preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) for sex selection , women’s
(reproductive) rights, and testicular cryopreservation
(TCCP). While one contribution explores a Bfuture^ of
reproduction, the other three explore a Bpresent,^ or better,
explore different Bpresents.^ This article pulls together
some reflections on the four papers and explores how
what may count as Bpresent,^ and what as Bfuture,^
changes dramatically, depending on the geographic decli-
nation of the tense.
Keywords Reproduction . Biopower . Ectogenesis .
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis . Reproductive rights .
Pregnancy
Introduction
Human reproduction is increasingly being externalized.
We have a number of technologies that make this pos-
sible: in vitro fertilization (IVF), preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD), gamete donation, surrogacy, and,
more recently, mitochondrial transfer technologies and
uterus transplant.
This externalization runs parallel to an increasing
commercialization of human reproduction which, in
turn, goes hand in hand with an unprecedented
responsibilization of reproduction whereby women are
regarded as Bmanagers^ of their pregnancies.
Nowadays, this is one of main axes of biopower and
biopolitical management, where Bindividuals them-
selves are responsible for the enactment of
biopolitics in reproduction^ (Mills 2015, 112).
This Bioethics and Biopolitics: Presents and Futures
of Reproduction symposium draws together a series of
articles that were each submitted independently by their
authors to the JBI and which explore the biopower axis
in the externalization of reproduction in four contexts:
artificial gestation (ectogenesis), PGD for sex selection,
women’s (reproductive) rights, and testicular cryopres-
ervation (TCCP). While one contribution explores a
Bfuture^ of reproduction, the other three explore a
Bpresent,^ or better, explore different Bpresents.^ What
may counts as Bpresent,^ and what may count as
Bfuture,^ has dramatically different connotations
depending on the geographical declination of the tense.
Presentation of Contributions
The paper BThe Perfect Womb: Promoting Equality of
(Fetal) Opportunity^ by Kendal (2017) discusses
Bpartial ectogenesis^—defined as the ability to grow
the fetus outside of a woman’s body for part of the fetal
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development. Kendal notes how partial ectogenesis is
already routinely practiced in neonatology. At the one
end of gestation we are now able to culture embryos
in vitro for longer (up to 11–12 days) (Deglincerti et al.
2016; Shahbazi et al. 2016), while at the other end of
gestation, progresses in perinatalogy have been pushing
the limit for viability of prematurely born babies down
from twenty-four weeks to twenty-three to twenty-two
(Mercer 2017). The paper by Kendal points to an
Belephant in the room,^ i.e. that in the ongoing discus-
sions of moving the limit on embryo research beyond
fourteen days and of germline genome editing
(Cavaliere 2017; Hyun et al. 2016) nobody seems to be
talking about ectogenesis. But ectogenesis is truly the
elephant in the room: if we did not have this limit,
research could continue beyond fourteen days to explore
ways in which an embryo can be sustained in vitro.
As a matter of fact, this is not research that is impos-
sible to do (as studies in other species show), but it is
simply research that is not done. Why is that the case?
Although the paper by Kendal cannot explore this fur-
ther, it seems to indicate that it might be a Btaboo^
subject in research, where there are so many other
ethical Bbattles^ to fight (think of embryo research or
of the renewed conflict around women’s reproductive
rights). Perhaps the battle to liberate women from their
biology is not one that raises the appetite of many,
including funders, in a system of scarce resources where
there are more Bpressing^ issues to attend. The reading
that ectogenesis could finally Bempower^womenwith a
final decoupling of reproduction from biology is also,
one should note, a partial one. Another reading
could be that ectogenesis could further Bdiscipline
women^ along the lines of the ways in which IVF,
oocyte preservation, and other technological means
of delaying pregnancy without compromising the
optimality of the process are now disciplining and
Bresponsibilizing^ women.
The paper by Browne (2017), BHow Sex Selection
Undermines Reproductive Autonomy,^ examines how
sex selection through PGD may not enhance but rather
undermine the scope of reproductive autonomy. This
paper is particularly interesting as it conceptualizes au-
tonomy in two ways: a) option and decision heavy
(focused on a range of choices) and b) ultimate goal
heavy (maximizing one’s freedom to achieve a goal).
Kendal argues that sex selection, while enhancing the
first kind of autonomy, undermines the second because
it derives its existence from gender essentialism, i.e. the
belief Bthat one cannot enjoy the same activities or have
the same kind of relationship with a boy as with a girl (or
vice versa)^ (Kendal 2017, 3). Kendal builds directly on
the work by feminist philosopher Catherine Mills and
her inquiry into biopower in the context of reproduction
(Mills 2011, 2015).
Kendall argues that we should move away from an
understanding of autonomy in reproduction from an
Boption and decision heavy^model, towards an Bultimate
goal heavy^ understanding of autonomy. In Mills’ words
(2011), we should move away from a negative under-
standing of reproductive freedom as Bfreedom from^
only (building on Robertson 1983, 2004) to a positive
understanding as Bfreedom to,^ which includes the
possibility to shape oneself while shaping others.
The paper by Princewill et al. (2017) BAutonomy and
Reproductive Rights of Married Ikwerre Women in
Rivers State, Nigeria^ is a qualitative paper investigat-
ing how women in the Ikwerre community in Nigeria
conceptualize reproductive rights and autonomy in mar-
riage. Princewill et al. set out to examine two things: a)
how married Ikwerre women understand reproductive
rights and autonomy and b) what affects the exercise of
their reproductive rights and of their autonomy within
their marriage (mainly economic and educational sta-
tus). Not surprisingly, the results of the study are that the
majority of these women have no knowledge or very
limited knowledge of reproductive rights, while they
have a Bfairly^ developed knowledge of what autonomy
meant, even though the exercise of autonomy was often
not perceived as being Bappropriate^ for a woman.
Princewill and colleagues argue that their study supports
Bcreating awareness^ among women of their reproduc-
tive rights, increasing Beducation^ to ensure
Bempowerment^ and promote gender equality. They
argue in favour of a set of values (autonomy, reproduc-
tive freedom, gender equality) and argue that the respect
given to a particular culture is inadequate and that re-
spect for cultural norms is unjustified.
However, one could not help but wonder what dif-
ferent analytical lenses applied to this case could reveal
about the lived experiences of Ikwerre women. One
example springs to mind—Miranda Fricker’s (2007)
concept of hermeneutical injustice, defined as Bthe in-
justice of having some significant area of one’s social
experience obscured from collective understanding^
(155). This is exactly the case of the Ikwerre women,
who cannot conceptualize rape in marriage as it is not
recognized in their culture. The adoption of Fricker’s
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lens could, I suspect, point not necessarily to a need to
Bincrease an awareness of reproductive rights^ but in-
stead to the extent to which these women are systemat-
ically discredited as Bepistemic subjects^ and therefore
prevented from being able to produce knowledge due to
the absence itself of the concept of rape in marriage as a
Bcurrency exchange^ in that particular economy of
knowledge. This lens would reveal power hierarchies
in knowledge that translate into oppressive practices in
society and articulate one of the axes of biopower in
reproduction.
Moving on, the paper by Petropanagos (2017),
BTesticular Tissue Cryopreservation and Ethical
Considerations: A Scoping Review^ is a good example
of Banticipatory bioethics^ (Schick 2016) that discusses
the ethics of cryopreservation of testicular tissue
(TCCP) as a means to preserve fertility (Banticipatory
bioethics^ as TCCP is an increasingly common practice
for cancer patients to preserve their fertility although so
far scientists have not been successful in producing
mature sperm from testicular tissue). Petropanagos’s
scoping review reveals that the ethical issues have been
analysed mainly through Beauchamp and Childress’
principlist lens in relation to four categories of individ-
uals affected by the practice of TCCP: 1) current pedi-
atric patients, 2) future adults, 3) future offspring, and 4)
patients’ families. Petropanagos’s review identifies two
key gaps in the range of ethical considerations thus
identified—a lack of integration of TCCP with other
aspects of healthcare (as this technology falls at the
intersection of several ethical domains such as cancer
care, pediatrics, reproductive ethics, and clinical
research with resulting unique issues that arise out of
the intersection of age, sex, gender, and disease context)
and a gap in the ethical literature examining social
context and meaning surrounding the value of genetic
reproduction (pointing to how a discussion of kinship in
both contexts would be helpful here).
Interestingly, Petropanagos notes that the range of
limited ethical analysis of TCCP is the result of the
emphasis on principlism as a framework for ethical
analysis within the clinical setting. This approach lacks
a discussion of the ethical considerations related to the
social context and relationships between the four cate-
gories of individuals mentioned above and also lacks
discussion of biopower as locus of control of the values
shaping the development of medical technologies.
Another interesting point raised by Petropanagos’
article is that TCCP could be used for other types of
patients, and these other uses need to be included in the
ethical discussion of TCCP. Indeed, paraphrasing histo-
rian of medicine Ilana Löwy (2015), while technologies
are initially shaped by the values and preferences of
people who develop them, they can—and often are—
later be modified by their users (202). For example,
TCCP could be used for elite athletes or high-
performance athletes who train to such an extent that it
exposes their bodies to stresses that become unhealthy.
Or, people could start to use TCCP as an Binsurance
policy^ against what may happen later in life, in a
similar way to what is happening to Begg freezing,^
which is now being offered by companies as part of
Bemployee benefits^ insurance plans to Bbank time^
(Waldby 2015).
Reflections
The papers in the Bioethics and Biopolitics: Presents
and Futures of Reproduction symposium, taken togeth-
er, articulate in different ways three points.
First, bioethics operates on two temporal dimensions:
while the subject of speculative bioethics is the future,
the actual point of influence is the present. It is in this
sense that, as put by Schick (2016, 225) Bthe imagined
future becomes an aspect of our present^ and creates a
Bcausal inversion^: it is the future that makes the present
and not vice-versa. However, we must note how a form
of Banticipatory bioethics^ is not by any means neutral
towards technologies, because addressing questions
raised by future possible technologies as if they were
already here (which, often, is not the case!) bypasses
fundamental questions such as Bwhat needs and prob-
lems [do] we have and which solutions, technological or
otherwise, would best address them?^ (229) and asks
only Bwhat should we do with the technologies that we
have?^ Bypassing these kinds of questions is in itself
problematic, Bfor the ultimate purpose, desirability or
even feasibility of the anticipated technologies cease to
be viewed as live issues open to ethical scrutiny and
public deliberation^ (229). This is a point raised implic-
itly by Kendal’s paper on ectogenesis but also—al-
though to a lesser extent—by Petropanagos’s paper on
TCCP.
A second point raised by the papers in this
symposium is that an analysis of current practices
can shed light on other practices. For example, we
can note how the discussion of ectogenesis in the
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paper by Kendal (2017) illuminates other current
practices i.e. social policing of pregnant women.
Currently, pregnant women are the locus of control
of society as molding them shapes future genera-
tions, and they are controlled both informally
through social pressure, or formally through med-
ical guidelines or laws that regulate their behav-
iours during pregnancy (Meredith 2016). However,
if we have ectogenesis, this locus of control moves and
the questions become: what, and to what extent, should
we control; and, who should decide what can be con-
trolled? Extra-uterine gestation would offer a new locus
of control for biopower.
Along similar veins, the discussion of sex selection
though PGD in the paper by Browne (2017) points to an
undercurrent of gender essentialism and to some of the
problematic societal assumptions regarding gender.
While we think we are promoting autonomy and gender
equality by letting parents choose the sex of their
children through PGD for Bfamily balancing
reasons,^ we are instead reinforcing ideas and practices
of gender essentialism which are fundamentally con-
trary to that gender equality. Browne argues that
the practice of PGD for sex selection is not only
based on a societal presumption of gender binary
and gender essentialism but that it also reinforces this
assumption by undermining the autonomy of parents
who think they cannot enjoy the same kind of activity
with a boy or with a girl.
Finally, two articles in this symposium point to
the importance of adopting different theoretical
frameworks in bioethics. The article by Kendal
(2017) challenges explicitly the Robertsonian re-
productive framework pervasive in so much work
in reproductive bioethics, building on the critique
of reproductive freedom operated by Catherine
Mills. The article by Petropanagos (2017) on cryo-
preservation also points out the limitations of
doing bioethics through only one approach, i.e.
principlism. Theoretical frameworks, or Blenses^,
in bioethics, can bring into focus different morally
salient features of the same cases (Sherwin 1999, and
also Pellegrino 1995). The adoption of multiple
analytical lenses can illuminate morally salient features
of a case, or of a practice, which would go unnoticed
otherwise. It can also help unravel some of the assump-
tions and value judgments that we make in the context
of some of the current practices of externalization of
reproduction.
Conclusions
As we know from Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,
observing a particle changes the position of the particle
itself. Observing is intervening (Hacking 1983). The
same, we could say, happens in bioethics, where
an analysis of the futures of reproduction changes
other, existing practices. That is why it is impor-
tant to reflect on reproductive practices in con-
texts, both diachronically (looking at practices in
their historical context) and synchronically
(looking at practices in their different declinations
in different cultures). Although Bconsiderable anal-
ysis—both conceptual and empirical—is still re-
quired to illuminate the politics and ethics of
choice in reproductive biopower today^ (Mills
2015, 120), this Bioethics and Biopolitics:
Presents and Futures of Reproduction symposium
is a step in the right direction.
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